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A wetland  has  no economic value in and of itself.  Nor does it have a unique value,
irrespective of context.  Economic value is ascribed to a wetland  by humans operating
at a confluence of individual preferences,  property rights, technological opportunities,
and available resources.  Such values are not generally  reflected in market  prices,  a
deficiency that can nonetheless addressed  by competent economic  analysis, using  a
variety of empirical  techniques.  The task is complicated by scientific information
shortfalls,  by ever-changing technologies and  economies,  and  by evolving societal
preferences--but  it can  be done.  Economic  valuations have been  used in wetland
priority rankings and in comparative  investment analyses.What  is a Wetland  Worth?
Concepts and  Issues in Economic  Valuation
Steven J. Taff
When you ask an  economist a simple question like What is a wetland  worth?,
you just know that the response will be:  "It depends!"  That's our stock answer to
most  every question, it probably seems to you.  But it's true.  It does depend,  on all
sorts of factors.  Which wetland  are you talking about?  What does it do?  Who  owns
it?  What is the threat?  The answers condition the wetland's  value, making the
estimate,  like all  economic values,  contingent upon context.
Many people balk, I know, to our "putting a dollar value" on  an important
environmental  asset like a wetland or on a flourishing ecosystem or on an  individual
salamander.  (I make the assumption that many of you fall into this camp,  since the
bulk of you  are hydrologists,  planners,  biologists,  legislators--anything but
economists.)  Humans clearly value these sorts of assets in  ways far more  intricate
and complex than those necessarily supposed in economic valuation studies.  But the
economic analyses are still worth  doing--for at least two reasons.  First, if we don't
sometimes  reduce environmental considerations to money terms, they might not get
the attention they deserve.  For example, the federal Water Resources Council's
"Principles  and Guidelines," the  bible for among others the Corps of Engineers,
requires that proposed project analyses include environmental  goods and  services
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aware,  really means "do an economic study."
So why not change the rules?  While it is a noble pursuit to try to get federal
decision rules altered to better reflect the virtues of environmental assets--the  dramatic
increase of the official federal project discount rate over the past decade is the result
of one such pursuit--it is  just as valid, I will  argue, to try to do a better job of estimating
the economic value of environmental services in money terms.  Not only is it required,
is sometimes very useful to have such values,  as we will explore  below.  That's the
second reason for doing  legitimate economic analysis.
What constitutes "legitimate"  analyses and  how we economists  go about doing
it is the subject of my remarks today.  I'll discuss first the source of economic value
and the types of value that might be  pertinent in a wetlands  setting.  I'll  then sketch
some  of the ways in  which we go about measuring  an economic value  held  by an
individual with respect to  an environmental asset that doesn't get traded in markets,
noting the assumptions necessary for us to aggregate individuals'  values into a
meaningful  overall societal value.  I'll close with  mention of a few issues that both
excite and vex working economists in this area.  Throughout,  my intent is to apprise
you of some of the potentials and pitfalls of economic valuation, so that you as  a
sometimes buyer of economists' services can be suitably aware  of the nature  of the
product you thereby obtain.
2WHY MEASURE  ECONOMIC  VALUE?
We want to  use economic information to help us make decisions about
wetlands.  The kind of economic valuation study we do depends  in part upon exactly
why we need this information.  That's in part a function of the decisions that face  us.
A crucial distinction is between  private valuations,  reflected in  the  land and other
observable markets, and  public valuations, often only hinted at by observable
transactions.  For example,  if all we  need to know is how much to pay a landowner to
acquire complete  rights to a given wetland,  we might  do a land  market study, focusing
on  how much  money it would take to convince the owner to sell.  Similarly, when
assessors want to know what value to place upon a wetland for property tax
purposes,  they too need only concern themselves with  market value.
When  public resource managers  are trying to figure out on which wetlands to
spend scarce program  dollars,  however,  they need estimates  not of market  values but
of social (as  interpreted by the agency) benefits.  Presumably, those wetlands whose
treatment  (preservation,  restoration, or acquisition) results in the greatest net social
benefits will be dealt with first.  These calculations can become  considerably more
complicated than  market studies, but they are analytically tractable.  Things become
more  complicated still in investment analyses such as benefit-cost studies where we
need to compare  "worth"  not only across wetlands but across completely different
projects.
There remains a significant conceptual difference  between valuing "a  wetland"
and valuing "wetlands".  The former might be asked if one were  estimating the  welfare
3effects of a project, say a county ditch repair, that in some way changed  a particular
wetland.  For this, one might  use any of several measurement  techniques that we will
discuss below.  (There remains still the problem of valuation of a particular wetland in
the context of a system of wetlands.  We  discuss this elsewhere,  as  well.)  The
economic value of "wetlands" with  no particular wetland  being singled out, might be
important in the context of evaluating a policy such as no-net-loss.  Here,  the question
we might be  asking is "How much  should we spend to do something about the
predicted further decline of prairie pothole wetlands?"  Much of the traditional  wetland
valuation technology is useless to answer such a seemingly simple  question, but
certain  new survey research methods permit  us to ascribe value to even  such a vague
environmental asset as "wetlands,  not otherwise specified."
WHERE  DOES  ECONOMIC  VALUE  COME  FROM?
To an economist,  there can  be no value without  human wants,  and there  can
be no costs without foregone opportunities.  The economic value  of a wetland  (as a
wetland) is whatever people are willing to pay to keep it from  being  drained.  Actually,
it is not even the wetland  itself that people value.  Rather,  people's  well-being is the
product of the various services that flow from the wetland's  basic physical and
biological functions.  Wetland functions like stormwater  retention create economic
value only because they provide  services like flood damage  reduction that people
value,  that people  are willing to  pay for.  If  there was  no change in human well-being,
there would  be no economic value.
4Economists use money to measure the intensity of human  wants and to
compare wants among  individuals.  We'd  prefer to measure  "utility," which  lies closer
to the  core of individual preferences,  the foundation of economic theory.
Unfortunately,  150 years of sometimes sterile but  always contentious debate  have left
us with the conclusion that we just can't do it.  Utility is "there,"  but we can't observe it.
As a result, we can't  measure it directly.  What  we can  do,  however,  is observe is how
people behave in markets or how they respond to questions.  What we  see are
choices,  and from those choices we can infer underlying  preferences and thereby
measure  individual valuations.  We then compare and aggregate  using a money
metric,  because such a measure has desirable theoretical properties for these
purposes.
So economic value is very much human  centered.  Wetlands  have no intrinsic
economic value, in our view, outside this human  context.  I might note  as  an aside that
most  of the noneconomic values claimed for wetlands are,  at their core, human
centered  as well.  For example,  the idea that some now-obscure  salamander  might
produce in its gall bladder (if  salamanders  even  have gall bladders!) a chemical that
might some day be used to cure cancer, so we  should treasure  a wetland  because it
houses salamanders--is  very much a service that humans desire and  economists can
measure.  Even the notion that wetlands  have value simply because they provide
habitat for salamanders,  regardless of their gall-bladder,  can  be linked to  humans.
Why worry about salamander well-being?  Because it makes  us feel good to know that
the salamander  flourishes.  (This is not the only philosophical justification for "innate"
5wetland values.  Norton  (1986)  is an excellent single reference for these  issues, even
though it nominally deals only with endangered  species.)
But we need not claim that all wetland functions can be linked to  human
preferences in order to do an economic valuation of the resource.  It is sufficient
merely to posit that some wetland  services are desired by humans.  All  an economic
valuation gives you is a money measure of changes in human  well-being.  In making  a
decision regarding wetland  use, human  actors need not  (and generally  do not) choose
on the basis of economic values alone.
If  you think of wetlands as a bundle of service flows--just like we teach our
students to think of property as a bundle of rights--each of which  has  its own
economic values, you can begin to see how economists  approach the question of
wetland valuation.  Each such service--flood damage reduction,  hunting opportunities,
scenic amenities, open space--associated with it a separable value, the estimation  of
which might require a different empirical technique.
The most critical distinction with respect to wetland services is that between use
and non-use values.  The former are those that require some  sort of direct human
interaction for them to have a non-zero  effect upon  human well-being.  Examples  are
hunting, sight-seeing,  flood damage reduction,  and  hay cutting.  I get no  use value
from a wetland if I don't use  one of these services.  These kinds of values can often
be measured by looking at associated spending  patterns  or by measuring direct
payments like access fees.
6But there is another class of wetland values that can in some  instances taken
on substantial magnitude.  The so-called non-use values are those increments to my
well-being that can be attributed to a wetland even if I never visit it or shoot a duck
from it or live downstream.  "Just  knowing it's there"  is enough.  These existence
values  (there are other types of non-use values,  as well)  can be measured through
certain survey techniques.  Some  people, I must caution you,  have difficulty in
accepting non-use values as "economic,"  and they may dismiss policy arguments that
rely  upon such values to any significant extent.  Many economists  increasingly
recognize, however, the validity of the concept (Kopp,  1991).
Part of wetlands' value come from  their system context, due to physical
interrelationships like migratory waterfowl  or water in a hydraulic regime, as  well as to
their relative scarcity.  The value of a set of wetlands is something different from  a
simple aggregation of their individually-determined  economic values, because of their
heterogeneity and  synergy.  While the value of a given wetland  may diminish with the
increase of the  size of the entire system, and while the value of the system itself might
exhibit diminishing marginal  returns, the total value of each can be expected to
continue to increase by size or complexity.
WHAT IS IT THAT VALUATION  STUDIES  MEASURE?
Economic value is, in the sense we're talking  here, the monetized  increase (or
decrease)  in human well-being brought about by a wetland  service.  Economic theory
can  show that this increase in well-being corresponds to what we  call "surplus," the
7extra money someone would  have been willing to spend for a good,  but didn't have to
because the actual  price was something lower.  Surplus is the amount  of well-being
achieved by the individual over and above the amount  of money that changed hands.
Technically, when we measure the economic value of a good or a service, we  seek to
estimate  certain areas under its "compensated"  demand  curves, which take into
account the fact that changes in spending  affect both individual utility and  income.
This works, as long as we can observe  (or infer) people's consumption choices under
different  prices.  But many wetland  services are not associated with a conventional
market.  What then?
First, consider cases where we  observe at least some  consumption choices or
behavioral changes.  Sometimes,  we can  get at the value of the wetland  service by
looking  at associated goods that do  have market  prices.  For  example,  the "right to
live next to a wetland" is not commonly  marketed, but we hypothesize that it has some
value to a homeowner,  nonetheless.  Since this proximity factor can  be thought of as
an "attribute"  of home ownership in certain locations, we  can turn to housing market
sales data infer the value placed upon nearby wetlands by property  buyers.  (For  a
Ramsey County  example, see. Lupi et al,  1991).  The result is,  strictly speaking, the
value  of the right to live next to a wetland,  not the value of the wetland itself.  Some
studies that purport to measure the value of a wetland  per se are actually valuations of
access rights or other quite human-centered  activities.
Another way to get at wetland values indirectly is to use government
expenditures to  infer the underlying  preferences  of society.  One example:  the
8Minnesota  Legislature  mandated a payment  of 50% of township average tillable land
values for wetland  easements acquired  under the denied-use provisions of the new
wetlands law.  (The metropolitan counties have a lower rate.)  A different value,  but the
same  idea, was declared  for wetland easement acquisition under the RIM  Reserve
program,  where the state paid on average over $800 for each acre of restored  wetland
easement.  We  could interpret this to mean that the  Legislature, in authorizing  and
continuing the program,  has determined  that the benefits to the people of the state
exceed to some  degree this expenditure level--else why do it?
A third  indirect approach could be labeled a replacement cost method.  If a
wetland service like runoff filtration  could be provided  equally well  by a sewage
treatment plant,  say, people are presumably indifferent  between paying for that
treatment plant or paying the  same amount to save or create a wetland to provide  the
same level of filtration.  The public value of the wetland, then, with respect to that
service,  is no higher than the  cost of the treatment  plant.  For, if you can get the
filtration from the  plant, why would you want to pay more to get the service from  a
wetland?  This reasoning leads to a convenient economic benchmark:  the maximum
economic value of a wetland  service is its full replacement cost.  This can  be  useful
because it sometimes  is a lot easier to estimate the cost of replacement than it is to
estimate the societal benefits provided by a particular wetland  or set of wetlands.
The above approaches give us value estimates of wetland services for which
markets  exist or which are  somehow associated with other goods traded in markets.
But how do we get values when we can't observe choices,  even indirectly?
9Essentially, we just ask people.  It's  not quite that simple, of course.  You'll often hear
the phrases "willingness to pay"  (WTP)  and "willingness to accept"  (WTA)  used by
economists doing wetland valuation studies, especially for non-use values.  The basic
idea is that the value is no more than whatever a person is willing to  pay to convert it
from  cropland or no less than that person is willing to accept as  compensation if the
wetland is converted to farmland.  Not surprisingly, the numbers we come  up with  are
heavily influenced by the existing (perceived)  distribution of property rights.  If I think
you  don't have the right to drain your wetland,  I'm  not going to express as  high  a
WTP  to keep it wet as I might otherwise.
This "contingent valuation" technique has  come to be the analytic tool of choice
among  many resource economists and resource management  agencies.  Its  popularity
lies in its ability to ascribe monetary values to goods and services that are never
marketed  (clean  air, for example)  or don't even  exist (a  million  acres of new wetland,
for example).  This is the sense in  which the valuation is "contingent":  people  are
asked, through highly structured surveys, what they would pay toward the  creation of
100 new wetlands,  say.  Now you might think that this is an extremely  dicey approach.
What's to keep people from  lying, as long as they never will  have to pay anything?
Two decades of practice have taught economist two things about what we  call the
possibility of strategic behavior: one is that proper  survey research technique can
reduce the opportunity for such behavior by respondents, and the other is that people
just don't lie very much in  these situations.
10Are the resulting values therefore the "correct"  ones?  That depends upon what
we  mean by correct.  All values and prices, marketed or nonmarketed,  are contingent
upon property rights, technologies, and individual  preferences.  Too, the price of
something is not necessarily its value.  People might be willing to pay more than they
did, and  sellers might have taken less.  So it's difficult to establish a benchmark value
against which to compare  the results of a valuation study.  Experimental  evidence
suggests, however, that the values obtained from well-constructed valuation studies
are  quite consistent over time and  across individuals.  (The best single source in  the
contingent valuation literature is Mitchell and Carson,  1989.)
It is sometimes argued  (especially by those who really like wetlands)  that
economic valuation studies are flawed  because  people don't really know just how
important  wetlands are to their well-being.  If  only they did know, it is claimed,  their
valuations, measured  perhaps through a contingent valuation study, would  be higher,
and hence governments  and property  owners would  choose to save more wetlands.
To be sure, all economic analysis is subject to problems  of ill-formed and  uninformed
preferences.  But the come-back is also  hard to refute.  What else have we to go on?
Individual choices at a given point in  time are assumed to reflect that  person's  best
guess at that time  as to what's best for him or her.  All of welfare economics,  indeed
all  of conventional economics, is based upon this notion.  If we don't trust individuals
to know their own  preferences, who is it that we should trust?
11WHOSE VALUES  SHOULD  BE COUNTED?
Whenever we do valuation studies--or economic  studies of any sort--we  have to
carefully draw some  circles (at  least figuratively) around the group of people whose
preferences are to be aggregated.  ("Accounting stance"  is  the formal  term.)
Depending on where we draw the circle--around the wetland's  locality, county, state,
nation, whatever--we  might obtain quite different economic values for a given wetland.
Two major factors come into play here.  The  larger the circle, the  larger is the  number
of people who might reveal a positive preference for a wetland  preservation  project,
say.  But at the same time, the larger the circle, the more  likely it is that certain
economic transactions, especially travel expenditures, get counted  as mere  "transfers,"
rather than as economic value.  Transfers do not count when we  measure  welfare
changes.  Very often, the "correct"  accounting stance depends  upon who asked the
original question or upon who is  to pay for the study itself.
The total value of a wetland  is  the aggregate of the values for all the services
held by  all the individuals within the circle of analysis.  For this aggregation  to be
theoretically correct, we have to make several severe restrictions about the nature  of
individual preferences.
Every time we compare your costs and  my benefits in a single-scale  money
framework  like the benefit-cost ratio,  we must either assert that everyone counts
equally  (the  usual decision, sometimes  called Utilitarianism)  or propose some
interpersonal  weighting scheme.  The only way to theoretically justify the  unweighted
adding up of individual valuations to arrive at a total societal wetland  value is to
12assume that everybody's  preferences  (or at least everybody within a separately
estimated  subgroup)  are the same  whatever their income.  We also  assert that
everyone's well-being ought to be changed equally, that there is to be  no redistribution
of wealth.  The former  restriction, which we call homothetic  preferences and  allows us
to speak of a "representative"  user,  is risky enough,  because we're  pretty  sure that
people don't actually behave in the way inferred  by such a restriction.  The second is
more value-laden, in that it says that an  additional dollar increases the well-being of
everyone the same.  For the most underpaid  graduate student and for the loftiest
football coach, each additional dollar has the same  affect on individual welfare.
Therefore,  when you accept your consultant's wetland value estimates,  you
usually implicitly accept the assumption that every individual's  preferences count
equally and that societal welfare  can be represented  by the simple sum  of individuals'
welfare.  We  do this all the time,  especially in benefit-cost studies.  We have to, to get
anywhere--but sometimes we neglect to tell you about it.
Even if you don't accept that these assumptions  are valid or even fair, you  still
might accept the resulting measures  of value  if you can be convinced that the
assumptions do not grossly violate the spirit and intent of your original need for the
analysis.  For certain decisions, the assumption of identical users does not do
grievous harm to the search for the "correct" value of a wetland.
A separate aggregation  issue is how values--however derived--are  denominated.
This is especially true when valuation is being  used for policy purposes.  For example,
if one is considering a policy of regulating wetland  drainage through a permit system,
13one might  want to know the valuation of that system from the  perspective of users.  In
this case,  a total valuation is probably more appropriate than would be a dollar per
acre measure,  since the  overall figure gives a better sense of the benefits of the policy
itself.  A dollar per user figure  might be appropriate when one is scaling a proposed
tax or user fee.  A dollar per duck (or some  other measure of service unit) figure  might
be warranted  if one is considering,  say, the merits of a scheme that would  pen-raise
and release birds as mitigation for wetland  habitat drainage.
IS  A MONEY  MEASURE  REALLY  NECESSARY?
The use of money as a common  metric is  traditional,  but not required  in project
analysis.  Any measure that permits  project ranking and  interpersonal comparison  and
aggregation  would be  suitable.  For  example, Costanza et  al.  (1989)  use  energy flux
(BTUs)  from  each wetland function for this purpose.  Although they then go on to
monetize their results, this is not a necessary step.
Another metric used in functional ranking  schemes is the habitat evaluation
procedure  (HEP)  modified by the Minnesota Department  of Transportation for their
wetland mitigation program.  A  HEP value is assigned to each wetland,  without
reference to demand for the services from that wetland.  (In  this sense, it is not a
human-centered  scheme  as is economic valuation,  although one  might make a case
that human  values permeate the system's choices of which habitats  are  "better"  than
others.)  As with  money,  if you  accept that a higher  HEP value is better than a lower
value, the metric is suitable for ranking wetland  projects.  If in addition you  can argue
14that the HEP scores are cardinal  (i.e.,  that the  differences between  scores have
meaning),  you can aggregate scores across wetlands to come up with a grand
program  score.  (The  proposed Minnesota Wetland Evaluation  Methodology has
similar merits, and it considers many  more wetland functions than does HEP.)
The drawback of any of these non-money evaluation schemes is that they do
not permit  comparisons across programs.  How  many HEP  points, for example,
should be traded off against possible investment in additional prison  capacity?  With
money, you can do it--with  appropriate assumptions  on individual preference structure,
of course.
Money values, for all their faults, are extremely  useful when it comes to public
investment analysis.  Nevertheless, the difficulties in assigning economic values to
wetlands has led some observers to call for a completely  different approach to wetland
decision making.  An  example is a recent nationwide aquatic ecosystems restoration
study that argues for what they call an  opportunity cost analysis (in  contrast to a
benefit-cost analysis), which  "accepts a human-based determination  of value but looks
to collective action to define values"  (National Research  Council,  1992, p. 359).  The
basic idea is to determine the costs (all costs, not just engineering costs)  of the
project but not try to value the benefits.  The decisionmakers are then to decide, "Is it
worth  it?"  While this approach to valuation can avoid confronting the problem of
putting a money value on wetlands, it cannot avoid the equally challenging  problem of
measuring in some way the intangible opportunity costs of a restoration project.
15Is economic valuation all that practical?  One of the arguments  made  in  favor of
using a single-dimension metric like HEP in  valuing wetlands is that,  even though it
looks solely at habitat functions, the resulting  rankings may not  be that far off from
those resulting from  more  extensive and  more costly full-function studies like the
proposed WEM.  Information is not free.  It costs money to get more  data to make
better decisions, and sometimes the resulting decisions are not that much  better.
Is there a similar method  in  the case of economic valuation?  Not right now,  at
least not one that is commonly  agreed  upon.  We do know that there is sometimes  a
tradeoff between "physical"  information  and economic information.  For example,
Kozloff et al.  (1992) found  cost savings in spending scarce information  dollars on
learning  more about the landowner's  sale price than in learning more  about how the
property contributed to off-site pollution damage.
WHAT ABOUT  NO-NET-LOSS?
When no-net-loss becomes the official policy of the federal or state
governments, there is a presumption that the present number of wetlands or the
present  level of wetland services has somehow  been determined  to be  at least not too
large,  else further diminution would be  allowed.  The policy does not imply, however,
that the present number of wetlands is optimal,  because room  is commonly  left for a
hypothetical increase in the service level.  The practical effect  of the  policy, however,  is
to  keep the current level essentially unchanged,  because expansion is so costly and
relatively few budget resources are dedicated to restoration or creation of new
wetlands.
16Once a declaration  of no-net-loss has been  made, the presumption  is that no
further  loss in wetland  extent will be tolerated,  whatever  the social benefits of drainage
or  other alteration.  Like endangered  species, wetlands as a class could then  be
considered to  have been  declared of infinite value.  Since many  wetland  services could
be replicated through  wetland restoration  or creation,  however, it is imprecise to speak
of no further loss of wetlands.  Rather, the  no-net-loss declaration is over the size of
the wetland service flow.  Specific wetlands  might be  drained,  but their services  (or
functions) must  be replaced,  either through  mitigation or full replacement.
A COUPLE  OF  ISSUES  ...
Not all is perfect in the wetland valuation  business.  (It  wouldn't  be as
interesting if it were.)  While economists tend to agree about what it is we're trying  to
do--measure the aggregate  money value of a change in peoples'  well-being caused by
a change in an environmental asset--we haven't reduced it to a cook book.  I'll
mention only two areas of recent theoretical and  empirical concern.  First is that of a
striking difference  between willingness to pay and willingness to accept measures  for
the  same environmental service, even though our received theory suggests the two
ought to be  quite similar.  The second is the lack of adequate "production  functions"
calibrated for specific wetland  types.
When economists first started getting really serious about linking welfare theory
and benefit valuation, they correctly  noted that the demand curves we  see in  the
world,  so-called  Marshallian  demand,  are not the theoretically correct curves to use in
17measuring  the change in social welfare.  Compensated  demand functions  (discussed
above) were  shown to be more  accurate.  The  problem is,  there are two  theoretically
correct surplus measures  (compensating variation and  equivalent variation),  both
obtainable  (with  some  computation)  from  observations of consumer  choice  and
market  prices.  Which  one to use?
Early  on, Willig  (1976)  showed that for many  of the  situations economists  were
interested in analyzing  (the welfare  effects of a price change,  as in a proposed tax),  it
didn't really matter.  The two  "correct"  (and unobservable)  measures of welfare change
weren't that far off from ordinary (and observable)  Marshallian  consumers  surplus.
Consequently,  consumers surplus could be measured  and used "without apology."
This was great,  because most analysts were doing this anyway,  both because it was
easier and  because the  data were so messy that they tended to (they still do)  swamp
any theoretical niceties.
The comfort this provided analysts was  considerable, because it seemed to
allow us to use either WTP  or WTA  questions to value a good  (especially a non-use
good)  at the  margin.  It didn't seem to matter much  whether we  asked  how much  the
respondent was willing to pay for more of the wetland service or willing to accept in
compensation for some  reduction in  the same service.  (Technically, the tight
bracketing  of EV and CV around consumer surplus was for the same  change, either
an increase or a decrease,  in the level of service.  Because of loose  language in the
literature,  however,  many writers equate WTP  with CV for an  increase and WTA  with
EV for a decrease from  current levels.  This causes no end of confusion with  students,
18because actually there are compensating  WTA  measures  and equivalent WTP
measures  as well.)
This was fine, but in an increasing number of empirical  studies of environmental
services  like air pollution in  the Grand  Canyon, the estimated  willingness to accept
measures  greatly exceeded the willingness to pay measures for the same  good.  This
was embarrassing,  since our theories said it shouldn't happen.  To the  credit of the
profession,  instead of theorists telling  analysts that applied research techniques  were
obviously wrong,  they instead started to change the theory,  often incorporating
elements  of the literature from  social psychology.  One thread  of the emerging  theory
(Hoehn,  1991)  suggests that the kind of service under consideration  matters  more
than we once thought.  If the service is one that people think is easily  replaceable by
some  other good or by the creation of a new wetland,  say, then the two  measures of
welfare will be fairly close together.  Either will do for a valuation.  But if the asset is
deemed  essentially irreplaceable,  with no substitutes, then the two  measures  might be
quite divergent.
Which  is the correct one, in that case?  Both.  What does this  mean for wetland
valuation?  Since the  bulk of wetland services are  likely, in my judgement, to be
viewed  as substitutable, the measures of value coming from  economic studies of any
one wetland  are likely to be reasonably close, whichever type of question, WTP or
WTA,  is asked.
The second problem  is one that economists can  only decry,  but not do
anything about.  To do adequate wetland  valuation studies, we simply must have more
19information about the services that result from  wetland functions.  Economic valuation,
relying as it does on scientific knowledge of wetland functions, is difficult when that
science is meager:
Economics, as an empirical discipline, lives near the top of the
information food chain.  While it is capable of generating  elegant (if
perhaps not universally acceptable) frameworks  for setting
priorities, empirical  implementation  requires enormous amounts of
information  about the physical and biological consequences of
decisions, much  of it currently unavailable. (Randall,  1986,  p.104)
Let me  give you an example.  We  recently did some work on the cost
effectiveness of the State's  RIM  Reserve wetland  restoration  program  (Lee,  1990).  Our
approach was to measure against the known costs of easement acquisition  and
engineering,  the sequential benefits of various wetland  services that were expected to
arise.  The idea was that if we found one or a few services that provided  measurable
public benefits that exceed the known costs, then we need  proceed no further:  the
program would  be shown to be a good  public investment.  (It might not  be the "best"
investment,  but that's another story.)  In particular,  we looked at the increase  in
welfare  attributed to increased  waterfowl hunting opportunities from the  restoration
program.  Through our empirical work, we were  reasonably satisfied with our
estimates of increased (monetized)  welfare per new  (dead) bird.  This is equivalent to
our knowing a portion of the demand function for waterfowl.
The problem was, we were unable to find a suitable estimate of the waterfowl
supply function: how many new birds could we expect from  each acre  of new
wetland?  Wildlife biologists have found this a difficult  number to get,  perhaps because
it is not the sort of number that is relevant for their own intellectual and  management
20endeavors.  But it is crucial for economic analysis of this type.  (Our study wasn't the
only one.  Bergstrom,  1991,  et al.  report a similar problem in their work on  Louisiana
coastal wetland valuation).
By the way, the best estimate on waterfowl  production we could obtain, coupled
with our empirical estimates of increased welfare,  led to an  estimate of total wetland
restoration program  benefits (waterfowl  production functions only) that was
considerably lower (like 90%) than program  costs.  Economic justification of the RIM
wetland reserve (and,  by implication, other wetland restoration efforts)  must  lie in
other,  as yet unmeasured,  wetland service values.
CONCLUSIONS
You've probably figured  out by now that I'm  not going to be  able to tell you
what a wetland is worth.  What I can say is  this:  A wetland is worth whatever  we  say it
is. This phrase may sound a little glib, but it contains a great  deal of my  message
today.  Wetlands  have no economic value in and of themselves.  Value lies in humans,
so it is we who determine valuations.  And since the majority of the services that
wetlands provide are  not marketed  (and so don't  have an observed  price)  and since
many of these are not even associated with goods and services that are  marketed
(and so don't have an  implicit price), we often  have to measure value by finding out
what people say about wetlands, by using carefully constructed surveys.
Economic valuations have  come to take  on large  presence in wetland  decision
making.  This may be for good or  ill, depending upon your own  preference structure.
21Whichever, it seems  reasonable to  require that if we do economic valuations,  we do
them  correctly and explicitly.  Most agency people are well-versed in the intricacies of
biology or hydrology or the law,  but they sometimes  ask for more  background  on the
economic research they frequently find themselves supervising or  even doing
themselves.  Good economic valuation studies are time-consuming  and expensive, just
as are good biological or hydrographic studies.  Even the emergence of some short-
cut or cookbook valuation techniques would  not relieve professional wetland
managers of the desirability of understanding more  about economic theory  and
empirical techniques.  I hope my presentation today  helped a little along these lines.
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